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Paige Snyder
Occupied Kultur: Cold War Competition and Musical 
Renaissance in Post-World War II Germany
¤
When Soviet occupiers marched into Berlin in May 1945, they 
found the once vibrant city decimated by the reality of defeat.  Streets, 
neighborhoods, and businesses were replaced by heaps of rubble.  The 
scene was the same all across the country.  But more damaging to 
Germans than their ruined cities was their tattered identity.  Germans 
had understood themselves as the bearers of high culture, a notion that 
existed long before Hitler reinforced it with his assertions of German 
superiority.1  But after years of war and a crushing loss, cultural life 
in Germany had all but disappeared.  Music halls, sets, costumes, and 
instruments had all been destroyed in bombings.  Additionally, after Nazi 
Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels announced “total war” in August 
of 1944, most opera and orchestral productions ceased and musicians 
were no longer playing music.2  After the war, the Allied occupiers, 
understanding that art and specifically music was a critical component 
of Germans’ self-awareness, went to great lengths to revitalize German 
music culture.  In doing this, the Allies hoped to not only eliminate any 
lingering effects of Nazism in music, but to promote their own cultural 
traditions as well.  Ideological differences, especially between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, put the Allies at odds over denazification 
and reeducation procedures.  However, it was specifically this Cold War 
animosity and competitiveness that inspired each side to push its cultural 
agenda in its respective sector, opening the door for innovative art and 
sparking a musical rebirth in Germany.
1  Michael H. Kater, “Introduction” in Music and Nazism:  Art Under Tyranny, 
1933-1945 (Laaber, Germany:  Laaber-Verlag, 2003), 9.
2  David Monod, Settling Scores:  German Music, Denazification, and the 
Americans, 1945-1953.  (Chapel Hill, NC:  The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2005), 24.
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Music had been used as a political tool in Germany long before the 
Cold War.  Nazi influence on music was considerable, perhaps most 
obviously in the persecution of Jewish composers and musicians.  The 
Nazis banned their music and forced them out of Germany, either into 
concentration camps or into exile, often in America.  Those non-Jewish 
musicians who remained enjoyed great public acclaim, state support, and 
career success.3  The Nazis also used music as a manipulative military 
technique, conditioning Germans from the time they were children 
to think of themselves as a part of a strong nationalist movement.  
Constantly hearing Hitler Youth songs had the subconscious effect 
of making adolescents act, as historian Michael H. Kater explained, 
“uniformly for the regime:  sing in unison, march in unison, and 
ultimately man the trenches, shoot, and kill as a united army.”4  But 
the most important role music played in the Third Reich was fortifying 
the national identity.  The Nazis claimed that the classical titans that 
Germany produced and their prominence in Western culture was proof 
of the country’s superiority.  Of course, Germans had long thought of 
their country as more culturally advanced than others, but by appealing 
to the people’s special relationship with German music and by venerating 
renowned German composers, the Nazis managed to place their Reich 
neatly in sync with the nation’s cultural glories.
This was a considerable problem for the occupiers, who were left 
with the thorny task of eradicating National Socialism, not merely in 
government but in the hearts and minds of Germans also.  This was 
a difficult chore:  the Allies had to purge Nazism but not appear as 
authoritarian as the Nazis, all while pushing their own political agendas 
and still preserving the spirit of the German people.  There were drastic 
reforms to all aspects of German life that had been tainted by the Nazis, 
from the administrative bureaucracy to the military.  But the occupiers, 
realizing that Kultur was such a vital aspect of national identification, 
also targeted classical music as part of their reeducation programs.5  
3  Christopher Fox, “Music After Zero Hour,” Contemporary Music Review 
26.1 (2007): 7.
4  Kater 10.
5  Monod , Settling Scores 4.
The Soviets wasted no time in resurrecting Berlin’s music scene, 
allowing the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra (BPO) to organize only 
five days after the Germans surrendered and rehearse eight days after 
that.6  In authorizing the recuperation of the BPO, the Soviets sought 
to earn the support of the musicians and intellectuals of Berlin by 
“cast[ing] themselves as the champions of German cultural tradition.”7  
As despicable as their actions were towards the general German public, 
the Soviets were well liked by the musicians and intellectuals because 
they fraternized with the Germans and revered German music.  Indeed, 
the Soviets and Germans had similar musical traditions.  Both believed 
it was the state’s responsibility to “sponsor, guide, and protect the 
arts” and both “viewed the arts as an integral aspect of society and 
were well versed in the European canon of high culture.”8  Because 
the Soviets had the same attitude towards the importance of music 
in society and the centralized coordination of music as the Nazis, 
they failed to truly transform music culture in Germany.  This laxity 
extended to Soviet policies of denazification as well.  Theirs was a “the 
show must go on” policy, and instead of trying to rid musical culture 
of the effects of Nazism, they overlooked musicians’ ties to the Nazis 
if they were especially talented or cooperated with the Communist 
military government.  To be sure, the Soviets tried to influence musical 
culture by situating exiled German Communists at top positions in arts 
departments9, but overall their jockeying for the loyalty of the German 
people, their admiration of German classical music, and their belief 
that the state ought to subsidize and promote the arts hindered any real 
attempt at Soviet denazification and reform in music culture.
By the time the Americans arrived in Berlin, the Soviets had 
already established cultural institutions and American officers were 
not happy with those arrangements.  Whereas the Soviets were willing 
to excuse musicians’ affiliations with the Nazis, the Americans were 
6  Amy C. Beal, “Reorchestrating Germany’s Culture:  Music after World War 
II,” Humanities 27.6 (2006): 46.
7  Elizabeth Janik, “The Golden Hunger Years:  Music and Superpower Rivalry 
in Occupied Berlin,” German History 22.1 (2004): 81.
8  Janik 82-83.
9  Janik 84.
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determined to eliminate all traces of National Socialism in German 
music and life.  Their harsh policies of denazification stemmed from their 
general opinions of Germans as inherently nationalistic, chauvinistic, 
and militaristic, with Nazism being simply the “latest and most vile 
manifestation of the German cultural and social character.”10  In order 
to ensure that the Third Reich would be the last of such manifestations, 
Americans barred anyone they associated with National Socialism 
from holding positions of authority.  In the case of performers and 
composers, this meant that anyone who was a member of the Nazi Party, 
corroborated with Nazi policies, profited from Hitler’s cultural policies, 
was a nationalist, or believed in the superiority of German music could 
no longer work as a musician.  In other words, most performers and 
composers were out of a job.11  In order to comprehend this strict policy, 
it is important to suspend our contemporary understanding of culpability 
in regards to the crimes of the Third Reich.  In the minds of the American 
occupiers, all Germans had an inclination towards aggression and hate; 
the only way to change that was to prevent the worst offenders from 
further influencing the rest of society.  
What emerged from this was the systematic vetting and blacklisting 
of German musicians.  In order to secure work as a musician, Germans 
had to fill out a series of forms and sit through a number of interviews 
concerning their role in the Reich.  Americans used the lists to determine 
who was employable and in what field:  “persons on the ‘black’ and ‘grey 
unacceptable’ lists were denied any work above manual labor (these 
were the ‘mandatory removals’); those on the ‘grey acceptable’ list were 
to be allowed to work at their profession but not hold ‘policy-making 
or executive positions’; and those on the ‘white’ list were free to take 
any job that was offered.”  By mid-1946, those lists bore the names of 
approximately 10,000 Germans in the media and arts.12  
The American program of denazification was baffling to Germans, 
who believed only the “xenophobic anti-Semites” could be justly 
10  David Monod, “Verklarte Nacht:  Denazifying musicians under 
American control” in Music and Nazism:  Art Under Tyranny, 1933-1945 
(Laaber,Germany:  Laaber-Verlag, 2003), 297.
11  Monod, Verklarte Nacht  299.
12  Monod, Settling Scores 47.
considered Nazis.13  Despite their distress over being universally dubbed 
National Socialists and criminals, musicians devised ways to skirt 
punishment.  Many professed to have had good relationships with Jews 
and that they did everything they could safely have done to protect their 
Jewish friends.  Some claimed to be unaware of the severity of the Nazis’ 
racial and social policies, that they had been too immersed in their work 
and compositions to notice the changes in the country.  A common 
excuse was that they were forced to join but they were not ideologically 
committed to the Nazi cause.  Others asserted that the fascists really 
did not like them, highlighting every bad review received or negative 
comment made about them during the Third Reich.  Interestingly, the 
composer Wilhelm Furtwängler, whose close ties to the Nazi regime 
were well known, insisted that his performances were “gestures of 
defiance that the Nazis could not comprehend.”14  Still, it was obvious 
that the performers and composers who worked during Hitler’s reign 
prospered from his banishment of Jewish and non-German musicians 
and most continued to believe in German musical superiority.  Thus, 
the Americans considered most of them guilty Nazis and eliminated 
them from German cultural life.  Their purpose was not to rehabilitate 
individuals—to turn fascists into republicans—but to rehabilitate German 
society as a whole.  
Beyond just removing musicians with National Socialist affiliations 
from prominent positions in musical life, American occupiers were also 
concerned with undoing the Nazis’ discriminatory cultural policies and 
establishing in their place new democratic values.  But this was a delicate 
situation.  Hitler had banned the performance of works by Jews or other 
so-called degenerate musicians.  In order to reverse that policy, the 
Americans had to promote those forbidden works.  But it was difficult 
to do so without legitimizing the Nazis’ racial myth.  Further, they were 
concerned that authorizing the performances of Hitler-approved German 
classics would affirm Nazi values.  Ultimately, they took the risk.  The 
classics were approved, but not necessarily vigorously promoted by 
the Americans; they did, however, push the performances of formerly 
13  Monod, Settling Scores 56.
14  Monod, Settling Scores 54.
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banned music while hiding the fact that they were promoted primarily 
because they had been suppressed during Hitler’s reign.15  
Americans also had to assess the role of government in music.  In 
the United States the arts were funded by private patrons; in Germany, 
it had been traditionally supported by public subsidies.  But because 
Germany now lacked wealthy patrons, the Americans knew some kind 
of government subsidy was necessary to revitalize the music world.  But 
a large, centralized government was “perceived by the Americans in 
1945 as one of their former enemy’s hereditary ailments.” Therefore, 
the occupiers had to somehow meld the traditions of both America and 
Germany where “the power of the state in the arts would have to be held 
in check by the rights of the public and the freedom of the artists.”16  In 
addressing the key to Germans’ national identity—music—the Americans 
hoped that they would be able to reeducate, denazify, and democratize 
the rest of the population.
Unfortunately, the Allies’ conflicting philosophies on denazification 
made it more difficult for the Americans to enforce their policies.  Not all 
of the Allies shared the same beliefs about eradicating Nazism and the 
guilt of ordinary Germans and thus did not enforce the same restrictions 
as the Americans.  Musicians that were barred from performing in the 
American sector were allowed to work in other sectors.  For example, 
Wilhelm Furtwängler was blacklisted by the Americans and forbidden 
from occupying a prominent position in the American sector.  The 
Soviets, however, ardently supported his return to conducting and let 
him perform in the Eastern sector.  Americans had to consent to his 
return, which “pav[ed] the way for other musical celebrities of the Third 
Reich.”17  The inconsistency regarding denazification among the Allies 
ultimately weakened American standards.  Since they could not enforce 
their policies everywhere, they were forced to adapt them and accept 
what they considered to be unsubstantial programs for denazification.  
The disharmony between the American and Soviet sectors was 
certainly not unusual in the years following World War II and its 
15  Monod, Settling Scores 31-32, 99, 124.
16  Monod, Settling Scores 27.
17  Janik 92.
results were often disastrous.   But in the case of German musical 
culture, the competition for loyalty and prestige turned the country, and 
particularly Berlin, into a vivacious center for the arts.  Contending for 
local cultural prestige, the occupying powers organized art exhibitions, 
reopened theatres, and issued newspaper licenses.18  Of course, both 
sides also encouraged the growth of the music society.  But while the 
Soviets promoted German works considerably more than Russian 
pieces, Americans promoted their own music as well as more innovative 
works that had been frowned upon by the Nazis.19  They saw American 
culture as the “vanguard of democratization” and promoted it whenever 
possible.20  For instance, American musical celebrities were brought to 
Germany to perform not only for the military’s occupying force but for 
local musicians as well.  Jewish-American composer Leonard Bernstein 
was scheduled to conduct the Bavarian State Orchestra in Munich and, 
as one officer noted, he made quite an impression on Germany’s musical 
elite:  “As news of Bernstein’s talent spread in the music community 
critics and conductors in the vicinity began to gather for the last two 
rehearsals.  The surprise expressed all too frequently was that an 
American could come and teach Germans how to play.”  The success 
of this visit “paved the way for other American musicians, conductors, 
ensembles, and orchestras who toured Germany during the years of 
military occupation and after.” 21  More important than giving them a 
new stage on which to perform, the tours of American musicians opened 
Germans’ eyes to the high standards of American music and helped 
them realize that fantastic talent existed outside of their country.  They 
understood that their musical culture was not altogether superior to that 
of any other nation.  
In promoting modern music, Americans hoped to show the Germans 
what they were missing during the Reich.  In 1946, the heavily subsidized 
Internationale Feirienkurse für Neue Musik (IFNM) in Darmstadt 
which “worked in tandem with radio stations to commission, record, and 
18  Amy Beal, New Music, New Allies (Berkeley, CA:  University of California 
Press, 2006), 20.
19  Janik 77.
20  Monod, Settling Scores 118.
21  Beal, New Music, New Allies 22-23.
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promote new repertoire” was established, opening doors for musicians 
wanting to experiment with music.22  It should be noted that the 
Americans perhaps naïvely thought that modern music was unavailable 
in Germany under Hitler.  In truth, while the Nazis certainly did not 
like modern music, it was still available for German consumption and 
those who were already interested in contemporary music were far more 
knowledgeable than the Americans.  Still, the promotion of modernism—
albeit more accessible modernism that featured polytonal, polymodal, 
and polyrhythmic effects without “casting away from the traditional 
tonal moorings”23 challenged audiences and pushed Germans’ musical 
boundaries, all while providing a sharp contrast to Soviet policies of 
music reform.
By 1948, the currency reform in the western sector sent Germany’s 
economy into a tailspin and led to the official division of Germany.  The 
political crises that immediately followed in Cold War Germany—the 
Berlin blockade and airlift—both hold a pivotal place in history.  But 
the musical culture of Germany was damaged by the introduction of the 
Deutsche Mark as well.  Germans’ savings were wiped out and the prices 
of goods soared even higher than the black market prices immediately 
after the war. One consequence of all of this was that there was a return 
to a conservative trend in music.  Because seeing a performance was now 
considered a luxury, Germans typically only went to productions of well-
named stars.24  Yet for those few years between the end of World War II 
and the beginning of the Cold War, Germany was once again a cultural 
jewel of the world.  Attempting to win the support of Germans and 
revolutionize the country, the Americans and Soviets initiated cultural 
policies that enabled Germans to not only embrace their own classics, 
but also experiment and broaden the definition of what is high German 
culture.
22  Joy H. Calico, “Schoenberg’s Symbolic Remigration: A Survivor from War-
saw in Postwar Germany,” Journal of Musicology 26.1 (2009): 18. 
23  Monod, Settling Scores 125.
24  Monod, Settling Scores 182, 193.
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Getting to the Root of the Problem: An Introduction to 
Fibonacci’s Method of Finding Square Roots of Integers
¤
3
Introduction
Leonardo of Pisa, famously known as Fibonacci, provided 
extensive works to the mathematical community in the early 1200’s, 
many of which still influence modern mathematics.  He experienced 
arithmetical studies in northern Africa and the Mediterranean, and 
later exposed his knowledge to larger portions of the world [3, 336].  
Fibonacci provided numerous works on the practical applications of 
mathematics, many of which are explored in his De Practica 
Geometrie.  Included in this book are his methods of finding square 
roots and cube roots, along with how to perform operations with such,
which he demonstrated has useful practical applications in 
geometrical calculations.
One may find Fibonacci’s method of finding the square roots 
of integers to be interesting, considering most people nowadays 
depend on a calculator to find such values for them.  However, it first 
must be noted that this mathematician was not the first to explore 
this topic.  The Rhind Papyrus suggests the ancient Egyptians 
explored this topic earlier than 1650 BCE [1, 30]. Square roots were 
also studied in ancient India, among many other places.  As discussed 
in the commentary of De Practica Geometrie [2, 37], a technique for 
approximating square roots long before Fibonacci entailed the 
following:  if N is the integer you wish to square root, let N = a2 + r, 
where a2 is the largest integer value squared which is less than N, and 
r is the difference between a2 and N (for example, 107 would be 
represented as 102 + 7).  A close approximation of the square root of N
is √N = a + r/(2a + 1).  Traveling to different parts of the world, 
Fibonacci acquired knowledge such as this and applied it to his 
method of finding roots.
Precursors for Fibonacci’s Calculation of Square Roots of 
Integers
Fibonacci aspired to find simple and relatively far less time-
consuming methods of deriving the square roots of quantities.  Most 
astonishing is the fact that he accomplished what he did without the 
use of symbols, relying only on explanation via words.  However, the 
lack of symbols, along with the lack of explanation in Fibonacci’s 
works limits the clarity with which a reader can interpret his methods.  
Modern notation allows us to tackle the task of calculating roots by 
hand in a much clearer fashion.
To begin root calculations by hand for Fibonacci’s method, it 
was important to know some simple but essential facts about the 
